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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MEREDITH PAGE and MAURINE S. ). 
pAGE, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
; 
vs. Case 
( No. 8815 
FEDERAL SECURITY INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, a Utah corporatio,n, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The Respondents have no serious disagreement with tire 
Statement of Facts contained in the Appellant's brief. Since 
the argument of the case requires a complete review of the 
evidence, no attempt will be made to call attention to any 
disagreement with statements therein made. 
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The Appellant has chosen to state its argument in seven 
different points. However, it appears to the Respondents that 
all of the points are directed to one issue, namely, was there 
sufficient competent evidence to justify the submission of 
the case to the jury? The question of whether Alma M. Page, 
prior to his death, delivered his insurance policy to the com-
pany, Appellant's Point One, is only one factor in determining 
if an election had been made on the policy prior to the insured's 
death. Whether the election was made in writing or orally 
is not the issue now before the Court or before the jury ( Ap-
pellant's Point Two) . Whether the insured intended to elect 
one of the options is the same issue as whether he, in fact, did 
make the election pursuant to one of the options (Appellant's 
Points Three and Four) . Whether the court should have 
granted the Defendant's motion for a directed verdict or the 
Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
or the granting of a new trial all raised the sufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the submission of the case to the jury and 
to sustain the verdict of the jury rendered thereon. For these 
reasons the Respondents shall answer all of the arguments of 
the Appellant under the following point: 
POINT ONE: THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE SUBMISSION OF THE 
CASE TO THE JURY AND SUSTAIN ITS VERDICT 
BASED THEREON. 
The defendant corporation places considerable emphasis 
upon the testimony of Mrs. Ruth Page. Mrs. Page came from 
Denmark in 1949, and it was obvious that she was susceptible 
to being lead by counsel and did not clearly understand all of 
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the technical terms involved. Her testimony in most instances 
was vague and indefinite. When being asked about a letter, 
Exhibit 12, the policy or discussions, some of her answers 
were as follows: 
"Q. Erich kept it? Now, afterwards, !vfrs. Page, did 
you and your husband receive anything through 
the mails from the insurance company? 
A. That is what I think we did." (R .25). 
Q. Now, after that, what did you do? Let me rephrase 
it. Now was that policy delivered to you and your 
husband? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Did you and your husband talk about it, the in-
surance policy, after it came back from the insur-
ance company? 
A. No, I don't think so." (R. 26). 
"Q. How did you know it was fixed? 
A. I saw the paper that I thought was with it. I don't 
know if it was attached. 
Q. Where was the paper which you saw? 
A. With the insurance when it came back. 
Q. Was it in the front? Was it in the back? Where 
was it? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. You don't recall where that piece of paper was, is 
that right? 
A. Yes, that is right." (R. 26). 
"Q. How did you know that it was fixed the way you 
wanted? 
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A. There must have been a piece of paper there. 
Q. Was anything in there besides a piece of paper in 
that envelope? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. I'll show you what has been marked Defendant's 
Exhibit 12 and ask you to read that and tell me 
whether or not you have ever seen the original of 
that letter? 
A. I'm afraid I didn't read it too well if we did get it. 
Q. Well, did you ever see a letter like that? 
A. Do I .have to say yes or no?" (R. 27). 
Although Mrs. Page used the word "paid-up" it was 
obvious from the discussions that that term was the one which 
best described the desire that some arrangement be made with 
the policy so that future premiums would not have to be paid. 
In the use which she made of the term, it could have applied 
equally as well to extended term at full face coverage for 
fourteen years, cash surrender value, or actually paid-up in-
surance. She testified: 
"Q. You wanted to make arrangements so that you 
wouldn't have to make any further payments? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You also testified that Mr. Olschewski told you of 
different ways to arrange so that you wouldn't have 
to make further payments? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were interested in cash surrender, reduced 
paid-up insurance, or extended term-any one of 
those ways-so that you wouldn't have to pay any 
more? 
A. Well, yes." (R. 30). 
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When asked if she recalled the discussions concerning a 
five-year plan with reference to the policy, the amount of cash 
surrender value which was available, extended term insurance? 
or whether the figure of fourteen years at full coverage was 
discussed, she state she didn't recall and added: 
'Tm afraid I let my husband decide what it is." 
(R. 32). 
It should be remembered that her deposition was taken 
prior to the trial, at which time the term "Paid-up insurance" 
was frequently discussed, and it is therefore not unreasonable 
to assume that with her understanding of these technical 
matters she would use that term to indicate the termination 
of any requirement that premiums be paid. 
The defendant company has attached to their brief a 
letter, Exhibit 10. It was established that they had requested 
from Mrs. Page any letters or correspondence which had been 
received by her or her husband from the company. Mrs. Page 
was unable to find the original of Exhibit 10, and that docu-
ment was submitted on the basis of the office copy, solely upon 
the testimony that under the normal office routine procedure 
it would have been mailed. 
Although the evidence cited by the defendant corporation 
might be sufficient if standing alone to warrant a judgment 
in its favor, or if the jury had decided in its favor it might be 
sufficient to sustain that verdict, it is submitted that the evi-
dence contradicting the position of the defendant corporation 
is more probative, is more substantial, is more credible in light 
of all of the circumstances and is more than sufficient to 
sustain the verdict of the jury. Clearly, it shows a definite con-
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flict in the evidence on a factual issue and therefore required 
its submission for determination by the jury. 
Any number of recent Utah Supreme Court decisions 
state the proposition that if there is any substantial competent 
evidence to support the determination of the jury, the same 
shall be affirmed on appeal; or, stated differently, that if the 
evidence is in conflict so that it cannot be said as a matter 
of law that all reasonable persons would draw the same con-
clusion from said evidence, then there is a factual issue to 
be determined by the jury. The Appellant has chosen to review 
the evidence in the light most favorable to its position; how-
ever, the traditional rules on review are to the contrary, more 
particularly, that the evidence will be reviewed in the light 
most favorable to the Respondents in this case, the jury having 
made a determination in their favor, and the Court having 
ruled in their favor in submitting the issues to the jury for their 
determination, and in later refusing a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, as well as refusing a new trial. 
The policy of insurance, Exhibit 1, was admitted at the 
time of pre-trial and was introduced at the time of trial. On 
its face there have been no changes, and there was not attached 
to it any rider or endorsement modifying or changing the 
policy. Consequently, it was admitted by all and ruled by the 
Court that, upon the introduction of the policy, the Plaintiffs 
had established a prima facie case. Thereafter, it became 
incumbent upon the Defendant to prove its affirmative de-
fense; more particularly, that the insured had elected to modify 
the policy to one of paid-up msurance. The case was tried 
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then upon the basis that the Defendant had the burden of proof 
upon this issue. The policy by its terms provides an automatic 
non-forfeiture provision to the effect that, even if the premiums 
are not paid, the policy will be continued on extended term, 
which in this case would have given coverage for a period 
in excess of fourteen years. There is another provision in the 
policy where, if the insured or owner of the policy at the 
time of its procurement so indicated, an automatic premium 
loan provision applied, and the cash equity in the policy would 
be used for an automatic loan to pay the premium. It was 
admitted by the vice president of the defendant company that 
there was sufficient cash equity that, if this provision were 
applicable, the policy would be in full force and effect on 
the date of the insured's death (R. 54) . 
The Defendant made the opening and closing argument 
before the jury on the basis that it had the ultimate burden of 
proof, and in its brief on Page 33 states that the burden of 
proof fell upon the Defendant to prove that the insured had, 
prior to his death, elected the option of reduced paid-up in-
surance. Therefore, the verdict of the jury may be sustained 
on either of two theories: First, that the Defendant failed to 
sustain the burden of proof, or, second, that there is sufficient 
competent evidence that they as a matter of fact made a deter-
mination against the Defendant and in favor of the Plaintiff 
that no such election had been made. It is submitted that the 
following evidence is ample to justify the latter determination 
by the jury and is more than sufficient to require this Court 
to affirm the verdict. 
Evidence was introduced that the Defendant company 
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did not have any written request showing that an election had 
been made, even though in other respects it was the policy 
of their company to require written elections or requests 
indicating modifications or other action involving policies. 
There was no carbon copy of the alleged endorsement or rider 
which was supposed to have been attached to the policy. It 
was maintained that the rider or endorsement had been at-
tached by eyelets to the front of the policy; however, the jury 
was requested to examine the eyelets to see if they had been 
removed or changed or if there was any evidence of fragments 
of paper remaining thereunder, indicating a document had 
been removed. Evidence was introduced that it was the usual 
custom to require that such an election in the insurance busi-
ness be made upon written request duly signed by the insured. 
It was maintained by the Defendant that it had advised 
Lincoln National Life, their re-insurance company, that the 
policy had been so changed. However, a search of the records 
of this only independent source of information concerning this 
matter failed to produce any evidence that such a change had 
been made, or that the company had been so advised of such 
a change. After the death of the insured, one of the Plaintiffs 
called and talked to a secretary of the Defendant company 
and inquired about the policy, advised the company that the 
insured had been killed, and was advised after some delay 
that the amount on the policy was the full face amount, minus 
a $400 loan. The documents of the company are inconsistent 
as to dates when the policy lapsed, and the date that the 
company maintains that the election was made. Although the 
company painstakingly made changes on numerous company 
cards and indexes with red pencil to the effect that the policy 
10 
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had been converted, they did not make any change upon the 
face of the policy, which they maintain was in their possession. 
Again it was testified that the usual custom with a policy in 
the trade is to make the change right on the face of the policy 
by striking through the face amount and inserting the modified 
amount for which paid-up insurance would be granted. The 
Plaintiff testified that he had a discussion with the vice presi-
dent and the president of the company, and that they stated 
a mistake had been made, and that if the re-insurance company 
would make payment, they would pay the full amount of the 
policy. Incidentally, counsel for the insurance company, in a 
letter after the issue was raised, stated that if the Defendant 
company is on the risk for an amount in excess of $10,000, 
then Lincoln National was also on the risk under the original 
of this agreement. Such evidence is more particularly reviewed 
as follows: 
1. NO SIGNED, WRITTEN DOCUMENT SHOWING 
AN ELECTION FOR PAID-UP INSURANCE. 
After the death of the insured, his father, one of the 
Plaintiffs, went to the office of the company and had a con-
ference with Mr. Olschewski. Mr. Page asked to see a copy 
of the election or endorsement. In this regard, Mr. Page testi-
fied as follows: 
"A. I met him, and Mr. Olschewski seemed to be very 
nervous, and I wanted a signed document from 
my son where he signed a document where he 
reduced the fact amount of that policy. 
Q. What did he say when you told him that? 
11 
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A. He became very angry. He said he didn't have any 
signature of my son. 
Q. Did he attempt to find one? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When he looked, were you present? 
A. I was present, my wife and my son's wife. 
Q. Did he go through the files in your presence? 
A. Yes, he went through many files. 
Q. Did he produce for you any instructions, any signed 
election? 
A. No, he did not. 
Q. Did he produce for you a copy of the endorsement? 
A. No, he didn't. I asked for that. I said, 'You say you 
have no signed document where he elected the 
paid-up insurance and reduced the value of the 
insurance? Where is the attachment to the policy, 
the duplicate?' And he said there would have been 
an attachment to the policy. I said it wasn't attached 
to the policy and he said he didn't have any dupli-
cate. I asked him, 'What have you got?' He said 
he had a carbon, two carbon copies of a letter 
he had written to my son. I said, 'Well, it seems 
funny you should have two carbon copies of a 
letter supposed to have been written to my son 
and no carbon copies of the endorsement or no 
carbon copies of the account of the original paid-
up endorsement." (R. 98, 99). 
On this matter, Mr. Olschewski testified as follows: 
"Q. Did you in this case request a written election by 
the insured ? 
A. No. 
12 
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Q. You do not have in your files any written document 
of any kind which he signed or otherwsie indicated 
what election he want to take, if any? 
A. That is right." (R. 59). 
2. IN THE INSURANCE TRADE IT IS THE USUAL 
CUSTOM, POLICY AND PROCEDURE TO REQUIRE A 
SIGNED, WRITTEN ELECTION WHEN A POLICY IS 
CONVERTED TO PAID-UP INSURANCE. 
Although Mr. Olschewski, vice president of the Defendant 
corporation, denied that at the time the change was made he 
knew that such custom prevailed in the industry, he did admit 
that he now knew such was the custom. He was asked: 
"Do you not know that it is the usual policy and prac-
tice of the insurance companies in this area to require 
a written election on non-forfeiture options? 
A. I do qot know that. 
Q. Do you know it now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you understand then that it is the general policy 
of insurance companies in this area? 
A. I think it is the advisable thing to do to prevent this 
kind of thing." (R. 61). 
Mr. Wilmer Barnett, cashier of Lincoln National Life, 
a Home Office employee, being employed at the Regional 
Office here in Salt Lake City, and who testified that he had 
had twenty years experience in the insurance business, testified 
about this custom as follows: 
"Q. Would you state what is the custom, policy, or 
procedure? 
13 
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A. Any person making any changes in reference to a 
policy does so only over the signature of the owner 
thereafter. 
Q. Does that apply to a non-forfeiture or other 
changes? 
A. To all changes including non-forfeiture. 
Q. What other types are there? 
A. The owner might change the benficiary on his 
policy. He has the right to change the ownership 
or control and transfer it to someone else. He may 
make an election of dividend options as well as 
non-forfeiture options in the policy. 
Q. In all those cases that same custom and procedure 
applies? 
A. The signature of the owner of the policy is the 
manner in which that is accepted." (R. 108). 
Mr. Olschewski testified that he had been with the De-
fendant company from the time of its inception in 1950, and 
that his duties involved policy issuing, underwriting, claims 
department, re-insurance and policy adjustments and modifi-
cations (R. 56). Mr. Olschewski testified that it was the 
policy of his company in connection with reinstatement appli-
cations handled by him that they be signed by the owner and 
that usually the company procured a written election in con-
nection with dividend payments (R. 56-58). 
3. THE COMPANY COULD NOT PRODUCE A CAR-
BON COPY OF THE ALLEGED ENDORSEMENT OR 
RIDER WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN AT-
TACHED TO THE POLICY. 
14 
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Mr. Olschewski testified that he was familiar with the 
office routine of the company and that it was the usual practice 
and procedure of the company to make carbon copies of all 
documents so that the company could keep a complete file of 
all transactions (R. 63). He further testified that he dictated 
the letter of transmittal and the endorsement at the same time, 
and that he did not instruct the secretary to either make or 
not to make carbon copies for the company's files (R. 63). 
The secretary, who happened to be the wife of the vice presi-
dent, Mr. Olschewski, testified that she made an original and 
two carbon copies of the letter (R. 85). The company could 
not produce a carbon copy of the endorsement which they 
claim was attached to the face of the policy. Mr. Olschewski 
was asked: 
"Q. Do you have a carbon copy of the endorsement 
alleged to have been attached to this policy? 
A. No." (R. 63). 
4. AN INSPECTION OF THE EYELETS ON THE 
POLICY INDICATES THAT NO RIDER WAS EVER AT-
TACHED. 
The company maintained that the endorsement changing 
the policy to one of paid-up insurance was attached to the 
face of the policy by the two outside eyelets. At the trial, wit-
nesses for the company were asked to take their knives, if 
they so desired, and to pry open said eyelets to determine if 
any evidence of scraps of paper were present to indicate that 
such a document was attached by the eyelets. The policy was 
passed to the jury for their examination. It is submitted that 
an examination at this time will show that the said eyelets 
15 
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have not either been removed or tampered with, and that 
they do not show that any rider was ever attached by them 
which has subsequently been torn off. This point is very sig-
nificant since it is the very position of the Defendant that the 
rider was so attached and an examination will not corroborate 
such a position. The inspection of the Court is invited to the 
policy and the eyelets attached thereon. The black photo 
copies of the original application had been attached by the 
center eyelet and had been torn off. An examination of that 
eyelet will show that part of the black document is still under 
the edges of that eyelet. 
5. LINCOLN NATIONAL, A RE-INSURANCE COM-
pANY OF THE DEFENDANT, HAS NO RECORD SHOW-
ING THAT THE POLICY HAD BEEN CONVERTED TO 
PAID-UP INSURANCE. 
It was maintained by the Defendant company that the 
re-insurance company had been advised of the change. In this 
regard, Mr. Barnett, cashier of Lincoln National, was sub-
poenaed to be present and to bring with him any documents 
or papers concernng any notice or advice from the _Defendant 
corporation regarding modifications of the policy. 
Mr. Barnett was asked: 
"Q. Mr. Barnett, were you advised that there were or 
were not documents available showing the change 
to paid-up policy? 
A. There were no documents showing it had been 
changed to a paid-up policy." (R. 107). 
In another instance, he was asked the following questions: 
16 
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"Q. Were you subpoenaed to appear in this action? 
A. I was. 
Q. And in the subpoena were you requested to bring 
any documents or papers concerning any notice or 
advice from the Federal Security Insurance Com-
pany that may have been received concerning the 
policy of Alma M. Page? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Particularly were you asked to bring any documents 
of the Company that would indicate that your 
Company had been advised that the policy had 
been changed to a paid-up policy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you and your Company make an attempt to 
acquire and to locate those documents? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. Our local office does not have the information with 
reference to reinsurance, so I called our Fort Wayne 
office and the Reinsurance Department and asked 
if there was anything there on file and I was in-
formed as to what he had found. 
Q. Did you request from that office any documents 
pertaining to this particular policy and the fact that 
it had or had not been converted to a paid-up 
policy? 
A. He informed me by telegram wtih reference to the 
information requested on the subpoena. 
Q. Do you have that telegram with you? 
17 
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A. I do. (Presents telegram to be marked as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 13) . 
Q. I show you what has now been marked as Exhibit 
13 and ask you if this is the telegram that you 
received? 
A. It is. 
Q. Does it say that there are no documents or evidence 
that the policy was changed to a paid-up policy? 
A. It does." (R. 105, 106). 
The telegram, Exhibit 13, which was received in evidence, 
states as follows: 
"No documents or evidence in our files that this 
policy became paid up or was changed." 
Without corroboration from the only independent source 
which the defendant company gave to the plaintiffs where a 
check might be made as to such conversion, the court was 
left with only the self-serving documents of the defendant 
corporation which could have been prepared or altered at 
any time. 
6. IT IS THE USUAL POLICY IN THE INSURANCE 
TRADE TO MAKE A CHANGE RIGHT ON THE FACE 
OF THE POLICY BY DRAWING A LINE THROUGH 
THE FACE AMOUNT AND INSERTING THE NEW, 
REDUCED, PAID-UP AMOUNT. 
In this regard, 1\tir. Olschewski was asked as follows: 
"Q. You say it is the custom that they do make a change 
on the face, of reductions to paid up policies? 
A. Yes." (R. 61). 
18 
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Although the company took great pains to write in red 
on numerous office cards which were introduced as evidence 
showing that the policy had been reduced and paid up, etc., 
it is submited that they made no change on the face of the 
policy itself, which is the principal contract showing the obli-
gations, rights and duties of the respective parties. It is their 
contention, as shown by their brief, that the policy was in 
their possession for the purpose of effectuating this election. 
It is interesting to note that in connection with Exhibit 3, in red 
pencil, a big "X" is marked through the amount of the insur-
ance and at the side is written, "Reduced, paid up." Then on 
August 8, 195 5, written in pen, it is stated, "Elected paid-up 
for $1,443," which is circled in red. Nevertheless, one "K.\Y/.", 
a secretary in the office of the company, at the very bottom 
of the card, wrote in pen, "Lapsed, 9/16/55. K.W." The 
secretary was identified but was not called to testify. It is in-
conceivable that she would have written on the bottom of the 
card, "Lapsed, 9/16/55" if in fact the red notations were 
placed thereon on 8/8/55 as was testified to by Mr. Olschewski. 
Mr. Olschewski testified that he could not explain why 
Exhibit 3 shows 9/16/55 as the lapse date. He testified as 
follows: 
"Q. Can you explain why Exhibit 3 shows 9/16/55 
instead of 7/16/55? I will ask you this question: 
Did that Exhibit 3 show the date lapsed was 
9/16/55? 
A. I can't explain why. 
Q. It has the initials here 'K.W.' Is K.W. one of the 
employees of the company? 
A. Yes. Kay Walker.'' (R. 71). 
19 
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It was testified to by Mr. Olschewski that at the time of 
the election on August 8, 1955, he made the various changes 
on the cards which were introduced. However, on September 
16, 1955, Exhibit 6, in a communication to Lincoln National 
Life, the policy was identified and was shown to have been 
lapsed. A document, Exhibit 8, produced from the files of 
the defendant company from Lincoln National Life Insurance 
Company, identifies the Page contract or policy and shows 
that it was lapsed. The entry was made on January 4 ,1956 
in connection with business for the month of October, 1955. 
If the election had been made as testified to on August 8, 
1955, it would appear that the records of the company should 
so reflect rather than have the delay to September and October 
and the notation that the policy had lapsed rather than that 
it had been converted to paid-up insurance. As has previously 
been stated, the automatic non-forfeiture provisions or loan 
provisions would make the policy in full force and effect even 
though it may have lapsed because of nonpayment of premiums. 
7. A SECRETARY OF THE COMPANY, AFTER THE 
DEATH OF THE INSURED, STATED THAT THE FULL 
FACE AMOUNT OF THE POLICY WOULD BE PAID, 
MINUS THE LOAN THEREON. 
Mr. Page testified that, after the death of his son, he 
called the company and talked to a secretary and requested 
from her the necessary forms, and inquired about the amount 
which would be paid. He stated that after waiting ten to 
fifteen minutes on the telephone, he was advised that the face 
amount of the policy would be paid minus the $400 loan 
(R. 97-98). 
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8. OFFICERS OF THE COMPANY STATED THAT, 
IF THERE WAS STILL REINSURANCE, THEY WOULD 
MAKE THE PAYMENT; THAT THEY HAD MADE A 
MISTAKE. 
Mr. Page testified that in a conversation with Mr. 
Olschewski he was advised as follows: 
''Well, Mr. 0 lschewski said he was very busy and I 
said I'd like to get this matter straightened out, and 
then at that time Mr. Olschewski said they had made a 
mistake and they would see if their reinsurance com-
pany would pay the policy. He said they would get 
them to pay it provided it hadn't been terminated, 
would be no loss to the Federal Security if the Lincoln 
National would pay the policy and he would investi· 
gate this case and see if that time had lapsed." (R. 
100). 
He testified further that a similar conversation was had 
with the president of the company in the presence of Mr. 
Olschewski (R. 101). In a letter from the general counsel 
of the company, Exhibit 14, after the issue in this lawsuit was 
presented, it was ~tated as follows: 
"Initially we wish to state that if you are on the risk 
for an amount in excess of $10,000, we are also on 
the risk under our original reinsurance agreement." 
Two Utah cases discuss the sufficiency of evidence in 
insurance cases to warrant a submission of the factual issues 
to the jury. 
In Palace Laundry Co. vs. Royal Indemnity Co., 224 P. 
657, 63 U. 201, the Supreme Court stated: 
"While the evidence respecting these matters, to the 
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mind of the writer, is meager and inconclusive, if there 
was some substantial evidence from which the jury 
could infer and find that the safe was broken open 
by the use of some tool or tools, and that there were 
some visible marks upon the same indicating that it 
was opened by the use of such tools * * * " 
The court then reviews the evidence and concludes as fol-
lows on this issue: 
"It is true that some other witnesses who saw the safe 
soon after the burglary said that they did not notice 
the marks testified to by the manager. The mere fact 
that they failed to notice them, however, was not con-
clusive. The jury had a right to believe the testimony 
of the manager and the other evidence which indicated 
the use of force and violence upon the safe. We are 
forced to the conclusion, therefore, that there was some 
substantial evidence showing that the defendant was 
liable under the policy.'' 
In Rouleau vs. Continental Life Ins. & Investment Co., 45 
Utah 234, 144 P. 1096, the court had occasion to consider the 
sufficiency of the evidence to present a jury issue for determi-
nation wherein the company produced carbon copies of the 
letter which purportedly served notice upon the plaintiff that 
the policy had lapsed. The court in discussing this issue stated 
as follows: 
"Up to this point there is no conflict in the evidence. 
The company claims that, in addition to the corres-
pondence referred to, it, on the 16th day of October, 
the last day of grace under the terms of the policy to 
pay the premium, wrote the plaintiff, and produced 
and put in evidence a carbon copy of the letter as 
follows: 
'Not having heard from you in answer to our 
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letter of the 5th, we have been compelled to cancel 
your policy No. 2508 on our books by its surrender 
value.' 
"There is proof that such a letter was dictated to a 
stenographer by the company manager, and that it 
was signed by him, but the defendant made no sufficien·~ 
proof that it was mailed; that it was deposited in the 
post office, or United States letter box, or delivered 
to a United States mail carrier, or other agency or 
instrumentality in charge of or under the control of 
the United States mail service. But that defect of proof 
is supplied by this: Plaintiff's wife, in writing for him 
on the 31st of October, the day he mailed the money 
order and the note, in that letter stated: 
'Just in reach of your letter of the 16th, for hav-
ing left my business in hands of others, for I was 
compelled to absent myself from the city, and on 
my return, see that this thing was not attended to. 
I now forward the amount required, trusting that 
you will accept it, although I know that it is late. 
If accepted, please send receipt.' 
"It is thus seen that in that letter reference is made 
to a letter from the company 'of the 16th.' The plaintiff 
in explanation of that, testified that his wife, and not 
he, wrote and signed the letter, and, in effect, that he 
had no knowledge that it contained such statement, 
and that the letter to which he, in fact, replied was the 
letter of October 5th, in that he had not received nor 
seen any such letter as that of the 16th. 
"On this evidence the case was submitted to the 
jury, who rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
for the face of the policy less the loan and unpaid 
premiums. The defendant appeals." 
It was the contention of the insurance company that the 
policy was cancelled on the 16th day of October, the last day 
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of the grace terms under the policy. At the conclusion of 
the case a motion for a directed verdict was made but denied. 
The court in considering the issues raised by such motion 
concluded that even under the foregoing set of facts, there 
was sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury. In so 
doing it stated as follows: 
"At the outset let it be said that, if the evidence 
without conflict shows, as contended for by the de-
fendant, that its letter of October 16th, 1911, notifying 
the plaintiff of the cancellation of the policy, was 
received by him, then the defendant is entitled to pre-
vail. The court so, in effect, instructed the jury. The 
evidence as to that, however, is, as we think, in conflict. 
There, of course, is good and sufficient evidence to 
show as has been seen, that the letter of October 16th 
was sent by the defendant, that it was received by the 
plaintiff in due course. That is supported by the plain-
tiff's letter written on the 31st acknowledging the 
receipt of the letter of the 16th from the company. But 
on the other hand, there is evidence to support a con-
trary finding. Supporting that is the testimony of the 
plaintiff that no such letter was received by him, his 
explanation how reference to 'the 16th' was made in 
his letter of the 31st written by his wife, his letter 
apparently responsive to another letter, the letter of 
the defendant of November 11th, wherein it undertook 
to state the time and the manner notice was given 
the plaintiff of a cancellation of the policy, making 
direct reference to and copying its letter of November 
2nd, but making none whatever to its alleged letter of 
October 16th, in the probability or improbability of 
its declaring the policy cancelled on a day on which 
it, under its terms, was not subject to cancellation or 
forfeiture, and not until a later day. What the real 
truth is in such respect, and whether the claim of the 
defendant or that of the plaintiff was supported by the 
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greater weight of the evidence, was for the Jury. 
(Citation of authorities.) 
"The defendant therefore was not entitled to a 
direction of a verdict, or to a charge, on the theory that 
the evidence without conflict showed that the letter 
of October 16th was received by the plaintiff and that 
he then was notified of the cancellation of the policy." 
The judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury was 
affirmed. 
All of the foregoing evidence is more than ample to sus-
tain the verdict of the jury. No written request, no copy of 
the endorsement, no changes made on the face of the policy, 
no evidence that any endorsement had ever been attached 
by the eyelets to the policy; that it was the usual custom to 
require a written request and make a change on the face of 
the policy; that the secretary said the full amount minus the 
loan would be paid; delay in making any change on the 
records of the company, and inconsistent modifications shown 
by their own self-serving records, plus the fact that the president 
and vice president of the company had said a mistake had been 
made and if there was re-insurance it would be paid, not 
only sustain the finding, but compel a finding to the effect that 
the defendant had not sustained its burden of proof in showing 
that a paid-up election had been made. 
CONCLUSION 
Recognizing that when a life insurance contract is to be 
construed and placed into effect, one of the contracting parties 
will be deceased, insurance companies are required to be 
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extremely cautious and careful in seeing that the contract 
is complete in all respects. An insurance company, which has 
a large office staff, trained personnel, and control of the 
various endorsements, modifications, and terms of the contract 
which are requested and discussed or agreed to by the con-
tracting parties, should be required to make sure that there 
can be no question about the terms of the contract. If a modi-
fication of the contract is to be accomplished, it is only reason-
able to require that that change be made on the face of the 
policy and, in addition, if necessary, that a rider or endorse-
ment be attached thereto. An example of the danger involved 
is present in this case if the defendant corporation is able to 
establish that there was a substantial reduction in the coverage 
of the policy by self-serving documents in their own office, 
which could be changed, prepared and produced at any time. 
Mr. Page, the insured, is not present to testify and there is 
nothing on the policy itself to show that there has ever been 
a change. The face amount was not changed, and there is 
no evidence that there was ever a rider or attachment made 
to the policy by the two eyelets as claimed by the defendant 
corporation. 
The trial judge, Judge Martin Larson~ recognized that 
there was a factual issue for determination by the jury when 
he denied the defendant corporation's motion for a directed 
verdict prior to submitting the case to the jury. He again 
reaffirmed this position in denying their motion for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, wherein 
he stated as follows: 
"The court thinks that there was a question of fact 
for the jury to determine and thought so at the time 
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he submitted the case to the jury, that there was a 
factual question for determination * * * . 
"The courts in Utah always tell the jury that they 
are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts and 
credibility of the witnesses. Now, if there is a question 
for them to pass upon, it would be kind of an absurd 
proposition to tell the jury that they are the sole 
judges of the facts and credibility of the witnesses if 
you view the facts and credibility of the witnesses the 
same as I do, and if you differ from me, then you are 
no judge of the facts or the credibility at all, so I will 
proceed to judge it. 
"So the motion that has been argued and presented 
is denied.'' 
The decision of the trial judge, as well as the verdict of 
the jury, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY, BOYER & RONNOW 
and DAN S. BUSHNEI .L 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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